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Putting proportionality in proportion
Whistleblowing in transnational law*
andreas fischer-lescano
It is now common sense that whistleblowing can be an effective way to
bring unlawful actions and social grievances to public attention. This has
spurred numerous international efforts, from corporate compliance gov-
ernance codes to endeavors in the political realm, to create transnational
safeguards to protect whistleblowers against repression and enable pro-
test against unlawful practices:1 Whistleblowing is central to the G 20’s
anti-corruption plan, measures instituted by the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the legal policy proposals
of Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and Transparency Inter-
national and national initiatives to establish “safe harbors,” which, like
the Icelandic Modern Media Initiative (IMMI), call for national media
regulations to offer the greatest possible protection for whistleblowers.2
Provisions designed to shield whistleblowers have been included in
the UN Convention against Corruption (Articles 8, 13, and 33), the
African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption
(Article 5 Paragraph 6), the Organization of American States’ (OAS’)
* I am grateful to Isabell Hensel, Johan Horst, Nora Markard, and Gunther Teubner for
their constructive criticisms of an earlier version of this chapter.
1 For an overview, see Buckland and Wills, Blowing in the Wind?; Bowers et al., Whistle-
blowing: Law and Practice; Schmolke, “Whistle-blowing-Systeme als Corporate
Governance-Instrument transnationaler Unternehmen,” pp. 224ff.
2 G 20, Anti Corruption Plan, Seoul Summit 2010, Annex III (7); Transparency Inter-
national, Recommended Draft Principles for Whistleblowing Legislation; OECD, Whistle-
blower Protection; Ritchie, “Why IMMI matters,” pp. 451ff.; and see the survey of the
present-day situation in Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Counter-
ing Terrorism (rapporteur: Martin Scheinin), A/HRC/14/46, 17.5.2010, No. 18: “Members
of intelligence services who, acting in good faith, report wrongdoing are legally protected
from any form of reprisal. These protections extend to disclosures made to the media or
the public at large if they are made as a last resort and pertain to matters of signiﬁcant
public concern.”
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Inter-American Convention against Corruption (Article III Paragraph 8),
and the Civil Law Convention on Corruption (Article 9) as well as the
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (Article 22) adopted by the
Council of Europe.3
The rise of legal protections for whistleblowing as a major concern
in transnational legal policy responds to the increasingly transnational
nature of the phenomenon itself: Whereas the classical forms of expres-
sion whistleblowers resorted to were chieﬂy disseminated by national
print media and intervened in national debates, the impact of twenty-ﬁrst
century whistleblowing is global. Due to the growing reach of digital
media, the emergence of worldwide communication networks, and the
work of WikiLeaks, whistleblowers have access to transnational distribu-
tion systems that allow them to disseminate information rapidly, effect-
ively, and beyond national jurisdictions.4 Especially in spaces of
transnational and privatized governance, which are largely impervious
to democratic control by the authorities of one or another nation,
whistleblowing thus becomes an indispensable source for the generation
of attention to breaches of law.
Security policy, where national institutions prize secrecy rather than
transparency,5 is another domain in which whistleblowing plays an
important role, revealing the tendency of transnationally interconnected
3 Even US President-elect Barack Obama issued a full-throated statement in support of
whistleblowing in his 2008 transition agenda – at least as long as the whistleblower
complies with the logic of the surveillance state rather than turning against it: “Often
the best source of information about waste, fraud, and abuse in government is an existing
government employee committed to public integrity and willing to speak out. Such acts of
courage and patriotism, which can sometimes save lives and often save taxpayer dollars,
should be encouraged rather than stiﬂed. We need to empower federal employees as
watchdogs of wrongdoing and partners in performance. Barack Obama will strengthen
whistleblower laws to protect federal workers who expose waste, fraud, and abuse of
authority in government.” Barack Obama and Joe Biden, The Obama-Biden Plan, avail-
able at http://change.gov/agenda/ethics_agenda (last accessed January 13, 2015).
4 For a general discussion, see Winter, Widerstand im Netz.
5 The ofﬁcial statement issued by the German Federal Government on August 13, 2013 in
reply to a question of the Social Democratic Party of Germany’s parliamentary group
concerning US wiretapping programs and the extent of the collaboration of German
intelligence agencies with their US counterparts (BT-Drs. 17/14456) is symptomatic.
“For reasons of the welfare of the state” (ibid., 4), large parts of the government’s
statement were classiﬁed as unsuitable for publication. The sections released for publica-
tion contain nothing but truisms such as the assertion that, given the realities of data
transmission, it cannot be ruled out that agencies may have access even to purely domestic
e-mail communications by tapping “networks or servers abroad” through which such
communications are routed (ibid., answer to question 15).
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security services to overreach in their surveillance efforts.6 Their
surveillance-state methods have long slipped the fetters of the rule of
law in the nation state. Aided by compliant global players in the infor-
mation technology business, from Yahoo to Microsoft, which have
received monetary compensation for their cooperation,7 they have dra-
matically undermined the democratic and participatory structures
charged with their oversight. Yet the ﬁeld of security policy is also where
whistleblowers, despite the widespread appreciation of their function as
transmitters bringing social norms to bear on economic, scientiﬁc, mili-
tary, and political decision-making, may suddenly ﬁnd that they have
exhausted the tolerance for their actions. When whistleblowers defy the
attempts of surveillance states to beneﬁt from what they do, when they
turn their critical attention to security policy itself, they quickly confront
severe political, economic, and legal repression: sources of funding are
cut off and activists face prosecution and defamation. Legal actions taken
to prevent the publication of documents and sanction whistleblowers in
response to the critical investigation of issues in security policy have long
been a “professional hazard” for journalists,8 as the proceedings against
The New York Times and Daniel Ellsberg in connection with the publi-
cation of the Pentagon Papers (1971), the indictment of Carl von
Ossietzky for the work of Die Weltbühne during the Weimar Republic
(1931), and the investigation against Conrad Ahlers and Rudolf Augstein
during the Spiegel scandal (1962) in postwar Germany attest. Most
recently, the cases of the WikiLeaks spokesman Julian Assange, who sets
the whistleblowing platform’s strategic direction, the WikiLeaks inform-
ant Chelsea Manning, who exposed war crimes in Afghanistan and Iraq,
and the American intelligence agency employee Edward Snowden, whose
2013 revelations on Prism, XKeyscore, and the NSA triggered the
ongoing surveillance and espionage scandal, demonstrate that the general
endorsement of whistleblowing is supposedly limited by putative duties
of loyalty and obligations of secrecy, reasons of state, operational inter-
ests, and other common good concerns.
In cases of conﬂict between disclosure and secrecy, the law generally
answers the question of which forms of whistleblowing are permissible
6 Deiseroth, “Whistle-blowing in der Sicherheitspolitik,” pp. 479ff.
7 MacAskill, “NSA paid Millions,” The Guardian, August 23, 2013.
8 von Ossietzky, “Der Weltbühnen-Prozeß,” pp. 249ff. (p. 250): “I know any journalist who
asks critical questions about the Reichswehr must be prepared to face charges of treason;
it’s a natural professional hazard.”
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and which are unlawful through the “application of statutory provisions
or regulations that call for adjudicators either to explicitly balance the
two interests or to enforce statutes that incorporate this balance in their
structure.”9 The judicial method of balancing and its schematic imple-
mentation under the principles of proportionality and practical concord-
ance are thus of crucial signiﬁcance when adjudicators must translate the
abstract principle of support for whistleblowing into speciﬁc rules and
resolutions of collisions, i.e., to answer the question of which forms of
whistleblowing are permissible when and where.
The focus of the following observations will be on the example of
whistleblowing in the ﬁeld of security policy. I will argue that balancing,
proportionality, and practical concordance as they routinely ﬁgure in legal
discourse are subtle instruments of repression. To disrupt the repressive
operation of this legal method, the principle of proportionality will need to
be reassessed. Only a tempered proportionality can facilitate rather than
repress the exercise of liberties. I will advance this hypothesis in three steps:
One, balancing, proportionality, and practical concordance have become
dominant methods in transnational law. As a consequence of this
methodological ascendance, civil liberties are subject to a blanket
reservation of ad hoc judicial restriction.
Two, the method of balancing and its objective of establishing proportion-
ality and practical concordance, as currently applied, conceals the
nature of the conﬂicts addressed by legal decisions and result in wrongly
framing social conﬂicts in the law that are divorced from reality.
Speciﬁcally, the conﬂict over whistleblowing does not pit subjective
liberties against individual and collective opposing rights, the objects
of legal protection that are conventionally balanced against each other;
instead, it is a conﬂict between impersonal autonomous spaces.
Three, the development of an adequate legal framework for the collision
of these autonomous spaces in cases of whistleblowing requires radical
depersonalization of the issue. Instead of basing legal policy consider-
ations on the good or bad intentions of whistleblowers from Edward
Snowden to Julian Assange and Chelsea Manning, we will need to
develop legal rules that do justice to the signiﬁcance of whistleblowing
as a transmitter of social values, as well as to the interests in conﬁden-
tiality of the transnational spheres of diplomacy, military affairs,
business, etc.
9 Fenster, “Disclosure’s Effects: WikiLeaks and Transparency,” pp. 753ff. (p. 783).
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Whistleblowing under the balancing reservation
In the age of balancing, the methodology of transnational law, like that of
other legal ﬁelds, is informed by the idea of optimization through balan-
cing.10 The techniques of balancing and the establishment of proportion-
ality and practical concordance developed in the international legal
dialogue11 have long broken the chains of national law. They have also
become the dominant method of judicial decision-making on the level of
transnational law. Proportionality, it is argued, is a universal constitu-
tional principle,12 a primary characteristic of global constitutionalism,13
or a central proposition of international law.14 Similarly, the ICANN
arbitration courts15 frequently render decisions on the allocation of
Internet addresses that translate the relation between property rights
and rights of expression into a matter of balancing:
There is arguably no unlimited guarantee of the right to freedom of
expression, since [the ICANN arbitration courts] ultimately already aim
to balance interests in the protection of private rights against the public
interest in the safeguarding of basic rights. This replicates a balancing of
individual against general interests provided in national law by the inter-
play of basic rights protections and general laws.16
This balancing process subjects the whistleblower’s actions to ad hoc
restrictions in light of colliding interests. In employment law, for
example, it yields a “balancing between the employee’s interest in dis-
closure and the employer’s interest in secrecy.”17 Along the same lines,
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has made the permissi-
bility of whistleblowing dependent on a balancing between employees’
10 Aleinikoff, “Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing,” pp. 943ff.
11 See Kennedy, “A Transnational Genealogy of Proportionality,” pp. 185ff., as well as the
comparative legal analysis in Knill and Becker, “Divergenz trotz Diffusion?,” pp. 447ff.
12 Klatt and Meister, „Verhältnismäßigkeit als universelles Verfassungsprinzip,” pp. 62ff.
13 Stone Sweet and Matthews, “Proportionality Balancing,” pp. 72ff.
14 Franck, “Proportionality in International Law,” pp. 231ff.; and see the critique in Peter-
sen, “How to Compare the Length of Lines,” pp. 1387ff.
15 ICANN (the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) is a private
organization that manages the assignment of Internet addresses (domain names).
16 Renner, Zwingendes transnationales Recht, p. 196; Simma, “Foreign Investment Arbitra-
tion,” pp. 573ff. (p. 591) speaks of “competing obligations” under different regimes.
17 von Busekist and Fahrig, “Whistleblowing und der Schutz von Hinweisgebern,” pp. 119ff.
(p. 121); on the collision between the employee’s duty of loyalty to his or her employer
and the civic duty to comply with prosecutorial requests for information, see BVerfG,
1 BvR 2049/00 of 2 July 2001 (disclosure of information to prosecutors does not
constitute sufﬁcient grounds for termination).
328 collisions otherwise
Comp. by: M.SIVARAMAN Stage: Proof Chapter No.: 12 Title Name: Blomeetal
Date:5/2/16 Time:04:31:12 Page Number: 329
rights to free expression and the affected opposing rights of employers to
the protection of their reputation and economic interests.18 It has stipu-
lated that the decision to go public with information must be a last resort
and made in the honest belief that the speciﬁc allegations have been
carefully veriﬁed and that the public interest in the information out-
weighs the damage caused by disclosure. In assessing the proportionality
of an interference with the whistleblower’s rights, authorities must con-
sider in particular the public interest in the information revealed. In this
context, the ECtHR has called for a fair balancing between the protection
of the employer’s reputation and rights on the one hand, and the
protection of the employee’s freedom of expression on the other hand.
But the balancing process itself remains mysterious: The court has
remained silent on which speciﬁc entities are to be balanced. A balancing
sensu lato that seeks to reconcile the interests of employers and employ-
ees is combined with remarks on the proportionality of the intervention,
which is in turn said to be determined by the public interest in the
information to be revealed. Yet the ECtHR has not said how this public
interest is to be gauged and what distinguishes public from private
interests, leaving crucial parameters of the balancing process vague.
The court thus retains a free hand in subsequent decisions and the ability
to intervene and make inconspicuous adjustments to the judicial practice
on a case-by-case basis, but this is detrimental to the establishment of
stable legal doctrine and hence to the creation of reliable protections for
whistleblowers. The outcome of the balancing process remains unfore-
seeable and whistleblowing is subject to the general and unqualiﬁed
reservation that property rights – which are conceived as equal-ranking –
must not be infringed.19
Similarly, in the ﬁeld of security policy, many attempts to demarcate
the boundaries of permissible whistleblowing consider the relative weight
of duties to protect, rights to security, and civil liberties.20 For example,
with regard to the release of information on the whistleblowing platform
WikiLeaks, it has been argued that the freedom of expression must be
“reconciled with potential opposing rights in the sense of a practical
concordance.”21 As a consequence, defenders of whistleblowing and the
18 ECHR, Heinisch v. BRD, 21.07.2011, Cs. 28274/08, para. 64ff.
19 For a general discussion of the prevailing obsession with balancing, which impedes the
formation of stable behavioral expectations, see Ladeur, Kritik der Abwägung, pp. 9–10.
20 Fenster, “Disclosure’s Effects,” pp. 753ff.
21 Hoeren and Herring, “Urheberrechtsverletzung durch Wikileaks?,” pp. 143ff. (p. 146).
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exercise of the freedom of expression are frequently called upon to justify
the legitimacy of such actions vis-à-vis the public interest in security as
an opposing right. In this scenario, however, the practical implementa-
tion of the principle of proportionality is often effectively an “assault on
human rights.”22 The formula of practical concordance, which demands
that in case collisions of constitutional principles by the competing
principles must be balanced in a way to realize the maximum effective-
ness of each of the principles, also operates in this way. The use of the
practical concordance scheme clearly shows that in situations of collision
between individual and collective objects of legal protection, community
interests may overwhelm civil liberties.23 The technique of practical
concordance, a modiﬁed adaptation of Gratian’s twelfth-century Con-
cordia Discordantium Canonum introduced to twentieth-century consti-
tutional doctrine by Konrad Hesse and Richard Bäumlin, who had been
students of Rudolf Smend,24 is a model of “repressive tolerance,” as
Bäumlin candidly acknowledged in 1970.25 Practical concordance allows
for a praxis that restricts the exercise of basic and human rights in favor
of collective goods even when the constitutional text would demand
that these rights be guaranteed without reservation. The fact that con-
cordance knows “no unconditional priority of basic rights over govern-
ment responsibilities” allows for
optimum practical concordance to be established between the different
elements of the constitution, and speciﬁcally between the section on basic
rights and the constitutionally prescribed or required government respon-
sibilities, such as schools, the military, and the public administration.26
This model quickly defeats mechanisms of constitutional protection for
whistleblowers. Considerations of proportionality in constitutional law and
the establishment of practical concordances then go hand in hand with
anti-espionage provisions and compromise the well-intended transnational
22 Tsakyrakis, “Proportionality: An Assault on Human Rights?,” pp. 463ff.; Rusteberg,
“Grundrechtsdogmatik als Schlüssel” pp. 15ff. (p. 19), argues that an imbalance is
structurally immanent to case-by-case consideration in such constellations.
23 For a more extensive discussion, see Fischer-Lescano, “Kritik der praktischen Konkor-
danz,” 166ff; on the collision of liberties and government objectives in the US, see
Mathews and Stone Sweet, “All Things in Proportion?,” pp. 102ff. (p. 116).
24 The locus classicus is in Hesse, “Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland,” 20th edn, 1999, para. 72: “The resolution of the problem must correlate
objects of constitutional protection in such fashion that each of them gains reality.”
25 Bäumlin, “Das Grundrecht der Gewissensfreiheit,” pp. 3ff. (p. 19).
26 Bäumlin, ibid., pp. 18–9
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codes designed to protect whistleblowing.27 To place the freedom of
whistleblowing under a sweeping balancing reservation is to gut it. As
soon as whistleblowers address the practices of security services, breaking
out of their role as private watchdogs in the service of state-surveillance
networks, tolerance for their actions is at an end. Tolerance is then another
term for repression. Herbert Marcuse put this succinctly in his essay on
“Repressive Tolerance,” criticizing that “what is proclaimed and prac-
ticed as tolerance today, is in many of its most effective manifestations
serving the cause of oppression.”28 Balancing, proportionality, and prac-
tical concordance rescind the liberties the transnational law-making
process has bestowed by shackling them to colliding individual and
community values.
The illusion of proportionality
This repressive substance of the legal method of balancing, which fre-
quently culminates in the establishment of putative proportionality and
practical concordance, results from a subjectivist mis-speciﬁcation that
has infected the liberal legal paradigm and its habitual practice of con-
sidering the relative weight of subjective rights and opposing rights.
Balancing, that is the basis of its methodological ascendance, enables
courts and legal workers to administrate justice in individual cases
without tying them into an emerging legal doctrine in any further detail –
to exert judicial decisionism, as Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde put it in a
critical essay.29 The adjudicators retain all freedoms in their decision
about colliding freedoms by veiling the principles of political order and
legal/policy values that underlie their decision so as to render them
unrecognizable: “It is not the dialectical concordantia discordantium that
makes this mixture so distressing, but the complete renunciation of any
reference to reality, which is an original sin of the law.”30 The opiates
of the balancing method drown social conﬂicts of interest in a twilight
state of harmonization allegedly governed by a rational and inclusive
logic that optimally unites all conﬂicting points of view.31 Balancing is a
27 Khemani, The Protection of National Whistleblowers, pp. 1ff. (p. 23).
28 Marcuse, “Repressive Tolerance,” pp. 95ff. (p. 95).
29 Böckenförde, “Grundrechtstheorie und Grundrechtsinterpretation,” pp. 1529ff. (p. 1534).
30 Wiethölter, Rechtswissenschaft, p. 74.
31 Of the many contributions on this point, see only Riehm, Abwägungsentscheidungen in
der praktischen Rechtsanwendung; Barak, Proportionality, pp. 458ff.
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dialectical miracle method: It makes the incompatible compatible and the
contrarian and fractious pliable.32 It transforms the philosophy of oppos-
ites into judicial method.33 The balancing method owes its appeal to the
fact that it provides a schema that can set argument and counterargu-
ment, right and opposing right, in relation to each other without having
to disclose the principles of political order to which the resulting deci-
sions conform.
It makes intuitive sense that the permissibility of whistleblowing
cannot be unlimited. So my point is not to criticize the use of balancing
to demarcate its boundaries. What needs to be criticized is how this
balancing is implemented, i.e., what is put on the scales.34 The judicial
method sets individual goods in relation to collective goods without
forming an idea of this relation. It translates social conﬂicts into conﬂicts
between legally protected rights or principles without taking an interest
in where the lines of social collision actually run. This transforms the
social conﬂict into a legal one that can putatively be resolved in accord-
ance with criteria of rationality, optimization, and inclusiveness. Balan-
cing as it is conventionally practiced is the subtle technique of judicial
hallucination. Entangled in phantom debates over the optimum imple-
mentation of subjectivist principles and values, the law remains blind to
the fact that the balancing process does not merely decide questions of
law and principle; its particular conception of the situation it balances is
already the result of the reframing of a social conﬂict internal to the law.
True, it is an inevitable consequence of the autonomy the law has
attained that instances of social conﬂict must ﬁrst be translated into the
language of law before the law can resolve them. The problem is not that
such translation takes place, but how it proceeds. The law’s vision of the
conﬂicts it resolves is in no way adequate to their complexity. It has not
evolved a sense – this is the point Rudolf Wiethölter’s trenchant critique
homes in on – for the judicial distortion of social conﬂict, for the realities
32 Cf. Heraclitus, Fragments, fragment 56, p. 37: “The cosmos works by harmony of
tensions, like the lyre and bow”; see also Taubes, Ad Carl Schmitt.
33 See Adam Müller’s treatise on opposites: Müller, “Vom Gegensatz. Erstes Buch,”
pp. 195ff.; for more on Müller, see Ogorek, “Adam Müllers Gegensatzphilosophie,”
pp. 96ff.
34 This point is made by Reimer, “. . . und machet zu Jüngern alle Völker?,” pp. 27ff.;
Poscher, “Theorie eines Phantoms,” pp. 349ff.; see also the critique of balancing in
Webber, “Proportionality, Balancing, and the Cult of Constitutional Rights Scholarship,”
pp. 179ff., and Kahn, “The Court, the Community and the Judicial Balance,” pp. 1ff.
(pp. 4–5).
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that are lost in the transformation into law, and for how the legal
reframing might translate social questions more adequately into the
quaestio iuris:
The legal premise of proportionality, I have sought to argue, is the most
inﬂuential transformative instrument for the osmosis, for translations, for
instances of covariance between law and society, the highest and most
general productive principle of a . . . justiﬁcation of rules of collision
guiding the decision in cases of competing rights, interests, needs. Legal
relations are indeed (in Germany, they have been since Savigny’s days!)
neither pure objects of assessment nor pure assessments of objects, but
always already pre-mediated general decisions concerning the correlative
association of facts with a speciﬁc law, as a qualiﬁcation of the legal answers
to social questions . . . The covert premises implicit in the application of the
theory of qualiﬁcation itself, i.e., in how the principle of proportionality is
applied, contain a complete program of social theory (sub verbo propor-
tionality, justice, or the like), because it is the theory of qualiﬁcation (not
the norm) that determines the selection of object domains, and because this
theory is determined in turn (not by norms, but) by the selection from
alternative highest value assessments. What stands in need of explanation
(and justiﬁcation), then, are the mediating deﬁnitions (association) of
objects of (e.g., commercial) law and a methodology guided by a substantial
theory (social purposes, systemic responsibilities, the circumlocutions are
of no concern to us: qualiﬁcations of proportionality as a theory of/for/in
the practice itself). Yet this critical work remains undone. Whether and
how it could be done is a question that cannot be answered with the means
of law, jurisprudence, and the legal profession.35
To summarize this critique: the law has only an inadequate and utterly
unreﬂective concept of what it is that the technique of balancing bal-
ances, brings into practical concordance, and sets in relation: interests,
rights, principles, objects of constitutional protection – there are many
candidates for a deﬁnition of the colliding entities. What they have in
common, however, is that it is always an individual and subjective
position (which may be identiﬁed as a right, interest, principle, or value)
that allegedly needs to be set in relation to individual or collective
counter-norms, -interests, -principles, or -values. This situation is even
adduced to justify the principle of proportionality as such in the perspec-
tive of a theory of norms: as a dynamic relation between norm and
counter-norm based on liberties conceived in subjectivist terms.36
35 Wiethölter, “Sozialwissenschaftliche Modelle im Wirtschaftsrecht,” pp. 126ff. (p. 139).
36 von Arnauld, “Die normtheoretische Begründung des Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatzes,”
pp. 276ff.
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This is exactly the gist of the matter: the law blindly adopts funda-
mental assumptions of liberalist models in which subjective liberties are
set in relation to colliding subjective or collective goods. Especially when
it comes to issues relating to whistleblowing, such mis-framing of the
conﬂict engenders absurd results and patterns of argument. For example,
the German Federal Ministry of Defense (BMVg) invoked § 97a of the
German Copyright Act (UrhG) to argue that intellectual property rights
(held, as individual rights, by the BMVg) forbade the publication of
leaked papers and that whistleblowers, in publishing them, had violated
the author’s right to ﬁrst publication granted by § 12 (1) UrhG.37 Even if
one frames the conﬂict in these terms with the German Federal Consti-
tutional Court’s holding, in the “Germania 3” ruling, that the commit-
ment to practical concordance – i.e., to “an equilibrium between the
various protected (in some cases, constitutionally protected) interests” –
extends to copyright law,38 or rejects the claim that government minis-
tries are creators in the sense of the Copyright Law,39 such arguments do
not chart a path out of the underlying judicial mis-framing of the issue.
Whistleblowing does not represent a simple collision between an indi-
vidual liberty (the whistleblower’s freedom of expression or freedom of
the press) and opposing individual rights (copyright law as an expression
of property rights) or collective goods (reasons of state, state security,
etc.). Couching the conﬂict in such subjective terms does not do justice to
its complexity:40 protecting whistleblowers is not about resolving the
collision between subjective rights or principles and opposing rights in
a way that safeguards individual liberties, but about the protection and
self-delimitation of impersonal autonomous spaces of communication.
The subjective right is then in fact what stands in the way of an adequate
approach to the problem of whistleblowing.
The reduction of transnational conﬂicts such as those ignited by cases
of whistleblowing to collisions of subjective rights and putative opposing
rights is divorced from reality. Corrections to details of the balancing
method such as a waiver of the proportionality test in balancing or a
narrow application of scope-of-protection analysis, which is designed to
avoid situations of collision, do not cut to the heart of the issue: the
37 Cf. Freeman, “Protecting State Secrets as Intellectual Property,” pp. 185ff.
38 BVerfG, 1 BvR 825/98 of 29.6.2000 (Germania 3), para 23. The decision concerned the
unauthorized use of passages from Brecht’s works in Heiner Müller’s play Germania 3.
39 But see Hoeren and Herring, “Urheberrechtsverletzung durch Wikileaks?,” pp. 143ff.
40 Springer et al., “Leaky Geopolitics,” pp. 681ff. (p. 685).
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subjective right as such, the scope of protection of the compact individual
basic right, the use of personal liberties as the unit of measure, is the
problem. True, the subjective right is itself the result of a process of
differentiation. The ius, as the integral union of rights and obligations
toward the community, and the Roman action, which identiﬁed rights
with their procedural enforcement, evolved into the subjective right
which is independent of procedural considerations and models of com-
munity. Its invention made it possible to shift legal relations from their
basis in bilateral reciprocity to a foundation of complementary behav-
ioral expectations – to unmix social relations, as it were:
Predetermined and judging symbioses of rights and obligations give way
to the social empowerment to act. The social reference is reduced to the
license granted to something that has its mainspring in the agent himself,
in his libertas intrinsica, in his will, in his interests.41
But the doctrine of subjective rights does not take abstraction far enough.
Instead, it has given rise to an empiricism of the law, with grave conse-
quences. This empiricism is not just a naturalistic fallacy: the problem is
not that the law refers to what is to draw conclusions concerning what
ought to be, as Hans Kelsen criticized in a discussion of Eugen Ehrlich’s
work.42 The situation is more dramatic. The fallacy lies in the very fact
that the law treats its social environment as existing and conceives it
as composed of actual subjects to whom subjective rights are assigned.
As Christoph Menke has rightly criticized,43 this establishes the empiri-
cism of the law as the determining fact in the legal constitution of the
bourgeois society it understands to be its natural basis. But rights cannot
be grafted onto pre-legal rationally oriented subjects. The subjects do not
actually exist in the form the law assigns them. They are merely as-if
subjects, projections of the law, an abstracting guise that reduces the
human being of ﬂesh and blood to a rational willing entity while also
obscuring the social conditioning of the homo iuridicus. The critique of
empiricism unseats the subject as the alpha and omega of the law. The
private autonomous legal subject is not the sun around which the legal
planetary system orbits. In a functionally differentiated society, its gravi-
tational pull declines.
41 Luhmann, “Subjektive Rechte,” pp. 45ff. (p. 74), trans. by the author.
42 Kelsen, “Eine Grundlegung der Rechtssoziologie,” pp. 839ff. (p. 843): “In the ﬁeld of the
law, the rules of is and ought are thus fundamentally different in form.”
43 Menke, Die Selbstreﬂexion des Rechts, p. 99.
putting proportionality in proportion 335
Comp. by: M.SIVARAMAN Stage: Proof Chapter No.: 12 Title Name: Blomeetal
Date:5/2/16 Time:04:31:13 Page Number: 336
These observations concur with analyses that have long highlighted
the trans-subjective nature of civil rights and liberties and chipped
away at the plausibility of the legal form of the subjective right. Niklas
Luhmann, who saw this keenly, criticized the judicial distortion of social
conﬂict into a collision of subjective rights, arguing that it had no answer
to the contemporary challenges in the system/environment relationships
of the global society:
Yet these are exactly the problems a functionally differentiated society
with subsystems that operate in relative autonomy increasingly faces, both
in the inter-systemic relationships internal to the society and in the
relationship between the social system and its natural and personal
environment. So the very social order that was built with the assistance
of this subject-centered language may ﬁnd itself in a situation in which
this language is no longer persuasive and becomes implausible.44
A law that describes society as made up of “subjects” does not operate at
an adequate level of complexity. It is divorced from reality, has no idea of
sociality, and distorts social conﬂicts beyond recognition. Because the
rational subject is the cornerstone of its thinking, it has no room for
ecological and social questions, no language for institutional conﬂicts and
no conception of human freedom.
Safeguarding impersonal liberties
So to conceive the protection of whistleblowers solely as a protection of
subjective rights – and even worse, to make the question of whistleblow-
ing hinge on the whistleblower’s good faith – is to misconstrue the trans-
subjective dimension of whistleblowing as a speciﬁc form of intervention
into public spaces. Whistleblowing defends basic forms of democratic
participation and control against the encroachments of a transnational
security apparatus that resorts to unlawful practices and renders those
responsible for them invisible. In WikiLeaks, a global space of communi-
cation has emerged that, as envisioned by the “Declaration of the Inde-
pendence of Cyberspace,”45 has attained substantial autonomy vis-à-vis
44 Luhmann, “Subjektive Rechte,” pp. 45ff. (p. 80), trans. by the author.
45 Barlow, “Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,” February 9, 1996, available at
https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html (last accessed November 13,
2015). The declaration begins as follows: “Governments of the Industrial World, you
weary giants of ﬂesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On
behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among
us. You have no sovereignty where we gather.”
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national legal orders.46 WikiLeaks initially relied on a cloud strategy to
safeguard the autonomy of this public space.47 During the publication of
the Iraq Papers, a network of mirror servers ensured the accessibility of
the data. With the recent efforts to install its servers offshore in order to
stabilize and preserve the autonomous space of free communication,
WikiLeaks seeks to permanently elude the grasp of national authorities.
Such spaces of free communication that defy the attempts of political
and military institutions and powerful businesses to seize, monitor, and
control them are the central requirement if democracy and the spontan-
eous and eruptive expression of opinions are to remain viable. Keeping
them free is the only way to counter the totalizing tendencies of the
transnational security apparatuses. Therein lies the democratic function
of a whistleblowing platform such as WikiLeaks.
The judicial search pattern, which is designed to identify proportional
and balanced forms of the exercise of individual liberties, is not even
remotely adequate to this fundamental signiﬁcance of whistleblowing to
democracy: To provide effective protection for whistleblowers through
safeguards of impersonal liberties while also preventing injurious acts
of whistleblowing, the law needs to map the lines of social conﬂict in
the quaestio iuris. The spaces of communication created by WikiLeaks
are spaces of the impersonal exercise of liberty. Following Helmut
Ridder, Karl-Heinz Ladeur has proposed a deﬁnition of “impersonal
liberty” as “the protection of the self-deﬁnition of a process of opinion-
formation that is also held to possess the ability to reﬂect on its own
rule-compliance.”
This capacity for self-organization is quite plausibly protected as a liberty
whose impersonal nature is apparent in the fact that it is not about the
self-deﬁnition of individuals but about the distributed generation of an
autonomous rule-compliant process.48
By focusing on the protection of spaces of personal autonomy, the
traditional theory of basic rights reduces the panorama of complex social
relations in which humans act in the context of differentiated social
spheres to a diminutive detail it then installs as the only world. But
society is more than the interaction of subjects endowed with reason,
46 See Teubner, “Globale Zivilverfassungen,” pp. 1ff.
47 de Filippi and Belli, “Law of the Cloud v Law of the Land,” pp. 1ff.
48 Ladeur, “Helmut Ridders Konzeption der Meinungs- und Pressefreiheit,” pp. 281ff.
(p. 290); and see already Ridder, “Die Meinungsfreiheit,” pp. 242ff.
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and so issues of basic rights are not exhaustively addressed by rules that
govern intersubjective freedoms. Instead, clear distinctions need to be
drawn between threats to the integrity of human beings, legal subjects,
and impersonal institutions. Conceived in this perspective, basic rights
are social and legal counter-institutions against the expansive tendencies
of social systems. They protect not simply subjective rights but,
depending on their particular form, human beings in their physical
integrity, legal subjects in their freedom, or impersonal and institutional
autonomous spaces.49
Broadening our view to include trans-subjective liberties allows us to
reframe the interwovenness of human and social emancipation in the
law: The free development of the individual is possible only in concert
with the establishment of social spaces of communication. I would like to
sketch the consequences of such a shift toward transpersonal liberty
safeguards for the legal situation of whistleblowing in three steps:
Step one – Facilitating the evolution of forces: In a ﬁrst step, it needs to be
understood that the protection of whistleblowers not only safeguards
individual personal development, but also protects the autonomous
space of communication. Ludwig Raiser urged early on that the
perspective of subjective rights must be complemented by a perspec-
tive of the emancipation of human forces via social institutions. To
protect social institutions means to safeguard space for human devel-
opment, and so his admonition is more relevant now than ever: “The
ability to develop one’s own forces and the opportunity to derive
economic proﬁt from doing so should not be understood as subjective
rights against competitors and customers.”50 In the same vein,
Gunther Teubner elaborates on the objective of facilitating individual
development through the protection of institutions in his argument in
favor of protection for whistleblowers, writing that the deliberate
promotion of divergent behavior in social institutions can unleash
forces of self-correction that stimulate “dissension, protest, opposition,
and moral courage amid the debilitating atmosphere of . . . hierarchies
and pressures to conform.”51 The purpose of such a liberation of
whistleblowing is then to establish a culture that facilitates divergence.
Fritz Bauer, who was the Hessian chief prosecutor at the time of the
49 Teubner, “Die anonyme Matrix,” pp. 161ff.
50 Raiser, “Der Stand der Lehre vom subjektiven Recht,” pp. 465ff. (p. 472).
51 Teubner, “Whistleblowing gegen den Herdentrieb?,” pp. 39ff. (p. 39).
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Spiegel scandal in 1962, saw this clearly when he criticized that, in the
cases of Rudolf Augstein and Conrad Ahlers, “non-conformism was
viliﬁed as punishable by jail.”52 The urgent need remains to develop
effective provisions to protect whistleblowers from sanctions. It is a
cynical state of affairs that Edward Snowden, Chelsea Manning, and
others are persecuted and prosecuted for security reasons because they
have dared to practice whistleblowing not only as watchdogs in the
service of the security services, but also as watchdogs over the security
services, in a challenge to the security complex. But in addition to
shielding individual whistleblowers and their associates and conﬁdants
from the grasp of the security complex, we must see the importance of
whistleblowing to the democratic process. Whistleblowing is not only
about individual emancipation, but also about social emancipation
and the unleashing of social forces.53 Put abstractly, the challenge is
to make a situation possible in which transnational security appar-
atuses are once again subject to, rather than in command of, the
imperatives of democratically organized social forces. Nothing less is
at stake than society’s ability to regain control of security policy and
socioeconomic conditions.
Step two – Identifying collisions: The collisions, disputes, conﬂicts of
interest, real contradictions, and antagonisms that arise in this context
are not simply collisions between subjective liberties (let alone prin-
ciples of subjective freedom) and (individual or collective) opposing
rights. Instead, they manifest a collision between incompatible social
spheres that overwhelm and compromise each other. Karl Marx pion-
eered the analysis of the destructive potential of economic rationality,
whose reach was already global in his day; his observations have been
conﬁrmed by many later writers.54 Max Weber introduced the concept
of modern polytheism to highlight the hazards inherent in the eco-
nomic sphere as well as other areas of life and analyzed the resulting
dangerous conﬂicts between different rationalities.55 Contemporary
analyses often follow Jean-François Lyotard in speaking of discourse
collisions.56 Meanwhile, the larger public has become alive to the
52 Bauer, “Schriftliche Stellungnahme von Generalstaatsanwalt Dr. Fritz Bauer,” pp. 135ff.
(pp. 139–140).
53 On the concept of force in this context, see Fischer-Lescano, Rechtskraft, pp. 115ff.
54 Most formidably by Polanyi, The Great Transformation, pp. 270ff.
55 Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre, pp. 605ff.
56 Lyotard, The Differend: Phrases in Dispute, pp. xi ff.
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social, human, and ecological risks posed by other highly specialized
global systems such as science and technology. The economic, scien-
tiﬁc, military, and technological as well as political spheres have
become embroiled in a “clash of rationalities” in the global society,
with all the attendant destructive tendencies.57 That has consequences
also for whistleblowing, which provokes conﬂicts of one kind in the
context of the economic system and another kind in the context of
transnational diplomacy and transnational security. Each area has its
own criteria to determine what constitutes the core interests of a
transnational public information which must be disseminated even
when colliding rationalities suggest otherwise. The judicial task is to
identify the precise constellation of spheres in each instance and to
develop adequate rules for such collisions that do not merely render
justice in individual cases, but lend themselves to generalization. That,
in turn, is the condition on which the possibility of the emergence of a
stable legal doctrine rests.
Step three – Putting proportionality in proportion: The method of the
establishment of proportionality must accordingly submit to a propor-
tionality test. The arbitrary approach to the conﬂict by means of the
unspeciﬁc consideration of the relative weight of principles of liberty
and their social constraints must be supplanted by the development of
norms that adequately protect a given social sphere against the
encroachments of other domains seeking to maximize the purview
of their own distinctive rationality. It goes without saying that the law
must safeguard, for example, the core domain of diplomatic exchange
and enable diplomatic conﬁdence-building, even in backrooms; com-
plete transparency would be prejudicial to diplomacy.58 On the other
hand, with regard to security policy whistleblowing, the military-police
complex cannot claim unlimited cover from public scrutiny. Yet when
secrecy is imperative and when it is impermissible must not depend on
the political classiﬁcation of something as “secret.”59 That would
subject the public sphere to politics rather than politics to the public.
So norms capable of generalization must instead be developed to
govern collisions between the logics of the public interest in disclosure
and the particular domain’s interest in secrecy. Their goal must be to
57 Luhmann, “The World Society as a Social System,” pp. 131ff.
58 That is the kernel of truth in the demands expressed in Ischinger, “Das Wikileaks-
Paradox,” pp. 155ff.
59 Sagar, “Das mißbrauchte Staatsgeheimnis,” pp. 201ff. (p. 217).
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enable public debate and discussion of sufﬁcient breadth and depth to
tie the spheres in question back to the public discourse of society.60 In
the tension between the autonomy of spheres and their responsive-
ness, the law’s mission is to develop norms governing incompatibilities
that counter the danger that politics, business, science, and other
spheres undermine the instruments of democratic control through
the ubiquitous invocation of common good interests such as security,
the welfare of the state or the need for secrecy.61 The function of the
law in this context is to defend transnational autonomous spaces of
public discussion, opinion formation and debate against interventions
and encroachments; i.e., in the ﬁeld of security policy, to allow for
democratic oversight and control over transnationally interconnected
security policies. As Adolf Arndt rightly pointed out in the early
controversies over the concept of the state secret, for defense and
security policies to be shaped in a democratic process, the public needs
to be “informed about facts that are signiﬁcant to the formation of the
popular will.” So in gauging the proportionality of an invasion of the
autonomous space of communication, it is vital that military forces
and intelligence agencies, too, “must remain subject to public control
and criticism; in cases of doubt, the decision must be against the
restrictive measure and in favor of the freedom of information.”62
With regard to the protection of and constraints on whistleblowing,
this implies that the whistleblower’s motivation is thoroughly irrele-
vant to the assessment of the permissibility of his or her actions. What
60 In a recommendation issued on May 14, 2013, the German Rectors’ Conference, an
association of public and state-accredited German universities, seeks to forestall public
involvement in cases of academic whistleblowing: “For the protection of the sources of
information (whistleblowers) and the affected parties, the work of the ombudsperson is
subject to strict conﬁdentiality. Such conﬁdentiality is broken when the source shares his
suspicion with the public. In so doing, he will frequently be in breach of the rules of good
academic practice himself.” Yet such a ban on involving the public effectively poses a
greater danger to scholarly work, which is based on the free discussion of the formal and
substantial qualities of scholarship and its social responsibility, than isolated inquiries
into cases of plagiarism; a critical point made by Preuss, “Man darf eine kritische
Öffentlichkeit nicht ausschließen,” Süddeutsche Zeitung of June 6, 2013.
61 On a norm governing cases of incompatibility in another context, see Teubner, “Ein Fall
struktureller Korruption?,” pp. 388ff.
62 Arndt, “Umwelt und Recht,” pp. 24ff. (pp. 25–6); and cf. the exclusion of “facts which
constitute violations of the independent, democratic constitutional order or of inter-
national arms control agreements by virtue of having been kept secret from the treaty
partners of the Federal Republic of Germany” from secrecy, as provided by § 93
Abs. 2 StGB.
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is determinative, by contrast, is that no protection can be claimed for
secrets whose legitimacy is dubitable and in fact an issue under public
debate: War crimes and human rights violations are in no way govern-
ment responsibilities to be shielded from a critical public, nor do they
belong to the legitimately secret core of transnational security policy.
Similarly, measures that infringe basic rights and rights to integrity
and that lack a sufﬁcient legal basis cannot be legitimately conﬁdential.
The actions of a whistleblower who discloses war crimes in Iraq and
Afghanistan, then, cannot be unlawful any more than the dissemin-
ation of information about secret surveillance programs operated in
transnational collaboration by intelligence agencies that manifestly
infringe the transnational basic and human rights to the protection of
personal data.63
The goal of whistleblowing, then, is not a completely transparent political
sphere; it is not trying to counter the total exposure of the private realm
by calling for a total exposure of politics. Whistleblowing aims to allow
for a public discussion of illegal and undemocratic practices of transna-
tionally interconnected security services that infringe civil liberties, and
to create room for the formation of public opinion. Such debate is a
necessity if we are to regain democratic control of central issues in
transnational security policy. As national forms of democratic oversight
and participation prove manifestly insufﬁcient, WikiLeaks, Edward
Snowden, Julian Assange, Chelsea Manning, and all those who venture
their lives for our freedom give us reason to hope that we will be able to
defend the foundations of our democracy against the transnational
network of intelligence agencies and security services.
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